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In this paper, I investigate a decade of change between foreign and domestic banks in 
the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013.  Using the Backward and Forward 
Stepwise Selection method to construct my panel regressions, I compare my findings 
to those of previous author(s) found in the literature.  I consider the factors that 
determine interest rate spreads, and find that all banks have become more efficient 
since 2000 and that non-performing loans for both domestic and foreign banks lead to 
higher bank spreads.  I find also, that bank concentration leads to higher spreads for 
domestic banks.  This paper theorizes that diversification of the banking system with 
the establishment of niche banks can lead to the reduction of bank concentration when 
placed in selectively highly concentrated sectors of the economy.  Further, 
diversification allows for increased competition in those sectors, without affecting the 
other sectors of the economy and the overall health of the banking system.  I find that 






The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom1 ranks 186 countries 
each year based on ten economic freedoms (the index assigns a score to each 
economic freedom, using a scale from 0 to 100 points), and then gives each country 
an overall economic freedom score from 0 to 100 points.  The world average between 
1995 and 2013 is 58.9 points.  Chile has been well above this since the index began. 
Chile’s largest improvement based on the ten economic freedoms has been in the 
Freedom from Corruption category raising its score from 50 points in 1995 to 72 
points in 2013.  The Heritage Foundation (2014) ranked Chile as the 7th freest 
economy in the world for 2013. 
In recent years, Chile has taken steps to expand its economy and to make its 
country more attractive to foreign investors.  In May 2010, Chile became the first 
Latin American country to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development2 (OECD).   In 2011, Chile, Peru, and Columbia combined their stock 
exchanges to form the Integrated Latin American Market3 (MILA) to enhance 
economic growth for all three countries.  In 2012, Chile, Peru, Columbia, and Mexico 
formed the Pacific Alliance4; which would make it the world’s eighth largest 
economy (if treated as a single country) representing 36% of Latin America’s total 
GDP and roughly 50% of its exports.  The four nations have eliminated 92% of trade 
tariffs between them and are working to reduce tariffs to 0 percent.  The goal of the 
Pacific Alliance (2012) is to build an area of deep economic integration and to move 
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gradually toward the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and persons.   
Since 1995, Chile’s economy and hence its banking system, has experienced 
significant growth in assets, deposits, and loans; while, the banking system has been 
shrinking at a significant rate during this same time period.  Brock and Suarez (2000) 
define bank spreads as an attempt to capture the cost of financial intermediation – that 
is, the difference between what banks charge borrowers and what they pay depositors.  
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the Chilean banking system and the factors 
that determine bank spreads from 1995-2000 and then compare those findings to the 










1The Heritage Foundation started the Index of Economic Freedom in 1995. The Index covers 10 freedoms – from property 
rights to entrepreneurship – in 186 countries.  More information can be found at www.heritage.org 
 
2The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development can be found at www.oecd.org/chile/ 
 
3The Integrated Latin American Market (MILA) was established in 2012 with Chile, Peru and Columbia combining their 
individual stock exchanges.  Mexico merged its stock exchange with MILA in 2014.  More information can be found at 
http://alianzapacifico.net/en/ 
 









This paper builds on the research performed previously by other author(s); but 
more so, on the research performed by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) who conduct 
an econometric analysis using panel regressions on the impact of foreign bank 
participation and concentration on bank spreads for five Latin American countries; 
Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru during the period 1995-2000.  The 
author(s) find that foreign banks are able to charge lower spreads and have lower 
costs than domestic banks.  Further, they find that foreign banks that acquired 
domestic institutions have higher spreads than those that established de novo (start-
up) operations, suggesting either some market segmentation or differences in pricing 
strategies to gain market share.  
Dell’ Ariccia& Marquez (2003) conduct a study of Chilean banks for the same 
time period 1995-2000, and find that domestic banks faced with greater competition 
from foreign banks, may shift their credit allocation towards market sectors that are 
more opaque, and where their competitors face greater adverse selection problems, 
allowing them to retain a larger market share and charge higher margins.  They refer 
to this reallocation of a banks’ portfolio as a “flight to captivity”, where spreads on 
bank loans are higher in markets subject to larger information asymmetries. 
I find for all banks, that non-performing loans are significant.  For domestic 
banks, I find that non-performing loans are significant at the 1 percent level; a one 
standard deviation increase in bank market share results in a .05 standard deviation 
increase in bank spreads.  For foreign banks, I find that non-performing loans are 
significant at the 5 percent level; a one standard deviation increase in bank market 
share results in a .06 standard deviation increase in bank spreads.  Martinez Peria and 
Mody (2004) find that administrative costs are significant at the 1 percent level for all 
banks and have a large impact on bank spreads; a one standard deviation increase in 
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bank market share results in a .6 standard deviation increase in bank spreads.  I find 
that both domestic and foreign banks have become more efficient, and that 
administrative costs are no longer significant from 2001-2013. 
The Chilean Banking System, 1995-2000 
In this section, we provide a comprehensive summary of the Chilean economy 
between 1995 and 2000.  We start with Table 1, which reports select macroeconomic 
indicators.  In the existing literature, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) find that foreign 
banks prefer to expand to countries where the expected rate of economic growth is 
higher.  Chile experienced strong economic growth from 1995–2000 with the 
exception of 1999.  Annual GDP growth was 10.6 percent in 1995 before it began to 
taper off starting in 1996, until it reached -0.8 percent in 1999 and then reversed 
course rebounding to 4.5 percent in 2000.  The national savings rate decreased 
slightly from 24.5 percent in 1995 to 21.2 percent in 2000.  Per capita income grew 
from $4,320 in 1995 to $4,920 in 2000, a 13.6 percent increase.  Inflation decreased 
from 8.2 percent in 1995 to 4.5 percent in 2000, while real interest rates rose from 7 
percent in 1995 to 17.9 percent in 1998, but then decreased to 4.1 percent in 2000.  
The United Nations (2004) reports that most of the foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flowing into Chile since 1990, has been from the United States (29%), Spain (20%) 
and Canada (15%), and that the largest portions of these investment funds has been 
allocated to electricity (21%), banking (15%), manufacturing (12%), and 
communications (9%).  FDI as a percent of GDP was 4.1 percent ($US 3.5 billion) in 
1995 increased to 12 percent ($US 8.7 billion) in 1999 before decreasing to 6.1 





Table 1. Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Annual  GDP Growth (%) 10.6 7.4 6.6 3.2 -0.8 4.5 
National Savings Rate (%) 24.5 23.9 22.7 21.4 21.2 21.2 
Per Capita Income ($US) 4320 4930 5380 5250 4910 4920 
Inflation (%) 8.2 6.6 6.1 4.7 2.3 4.5 
Real Interest Rates (%) 7.0 14.3 10.9 17.9 9.9 4.1 
Foreign Direct Investment (% 
GDP) 4.1 6.4 6.4 5.8 12.0 6.1 
Source:  World Bank 
The Heritage Foundation (2014) finds that Chile largely maintained the 
market-based institutions and economic policies established by General Augusto 
Pinochet5 (Chile’s 30th President) from 1973-1990.  From Table 2, we can see that 
Chile improved its overall Heritage Foundation Index score from 71.2 points in 1995 
to 74.7 points in 2000.  Chile’s largest improvement was with its monetary policy, 
increasing its score from 66.1 points in 1995 to 80.1 points in 2000.  However, both 
Chile’s fiscal policy and government spending scores decreased from 1995-2000.  
Fiscal policy decreased from 79.4 points in 1995 to 73.2 points in 2000; while, 





5General Augusto Pinochet was responsible for changing many economic reform policies based on the advice of the “Chicago 






Table 2.  Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Chile’s Overall Score 71.2 72.6 75.9 74.9 74.1 74.7 
Fiscal Policy 79.4 89.8 73.5 73.0 73.0 73.2 
Monetary Policy 66.1 68.0 75.6 77.1 78.7 80.1 
Government Spending 87.0 85.9 86.6 88.1 87.1 85.5 
Source:  The Heritage Foundation 
Starting in 2019, Basel III requires all financial institutions to have a minimum 
tier 1 capital ratio of 6 percent and a capital to risk-weighted asset (CAR) ratio of 10.5 
percent.  As we can see in Table 3, the Chilean banking system has been well above 
these requirements since 1998.  In 1998, CAR is 10.6 percent and tier 1 capital is 12.5 
percent.  In 2000, CAR is 13.3 percent and tier 1 capital is 10.5%.  Non-performing 
loans increased from 1.2 percent in 1997 to 1.9 percent in 2000.  Chilean banks return 
on equity decreased to its lowest level of 9.4 percent in 1999, but increased to 12.7 
percent in 2000.  The banking system’s liquid assets increased from 16.6 percent in 
1997 to 16.9 percent in 2000.  Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that banks that 
either decide or are required by regulation to hold a high proportion of their assets in 
the form of liquid assets seem to charge higher spreads.  The author(s) find liquid 
assets to be significant at the 1 percent level for all banks from 1995-2000.  I find that 
liquid assets are still significant for foreign banks from 2001-2013; however, the 
impact on spreads is small; a one standard deviation increase in liquidity raises 





Table 3.  Financial Soundness Indicators (%). 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted 
Assets (CAR) n.a. n.a n.a. 12.5 13.5 13.3 
Tier 1 Capital n.a. n.a. 11.0 10.6 10.5 10.5 
Non-Performing Loans 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.9 
Return on Assets 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 
Equity 13.9 16.6 13.7 11.5 9.4 12.7 
Liquidity n.a. n.a. 16.6 15.2 17.7 16.9 
Source: Authur’s calculations 
  IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004 
 Central Bank of Chile 
 
Chile’s banking system reaped significant growth from 1995-2000.  Table 4, 
shows that foreign banks share of loans grew substantially from 13.7 percent to 45.1 
percent during this time period.  The top-3 banks market share increased 12 percent 
from 36.6 percent in 1995 to 41.1 percent in 2000.  The top-5 banks market share 
increased 19 percent from 51.9 percent in 1995 to 61.8 percent in 2000.  Also, the 
Herfindahl index (HHI) which measures market concentration, increased from 789 
points in 1995 to 923 points in 2000.  The total number of banks decreased from 31 to 
27 in Chile during the same time period; while, the number of foreign banks stayed 







Table 4.  Chile’s Banking System. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Foreign Bank Share of Loans (%) 13.7 16.7 20.3 21.5 37.7 45.1 
Top-3 Bank Share of Loans (%) 36.6 35.7 42.5 42.1 41.5 41.1 
Top-5 Bank Share of Loans (%) 51.9 52.6 62.5 62.1 61.9 61.8 
Herfindahl Index (Loans) 789 796 983 973 961 923 
Number of Banks 31 31 29 29 29 27 
Number of Foreign Banks 17 17 17 17 18 17 
Source:  Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) 
Note:  A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership. 
Note:  A HHI of less than 1500 points is considered to be un-concentrated and a 
highly competitivebanking system. 
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s National 
Bank. 
 
Chilean bank spreads for 1995-2000 varied between 4.5 and 5 percent except 
for in 2000 when domestic banks spreads rose to 6 percent.  Martinez Peria and Mody 
(2004) find that foreign and domestic spreads appear to move very much in tandem in 
Chile.  Their study shows that macroeconomic factors or similar cost structures may 
be affecting all banks in the system, as well as the possibility that foreign and 
domestic banks are competing with each other for customers.  Brock and Suarez 
(2000) explore the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America (including Chile), 
during the mid-1990s and find that banks that orient their services towards retail 
operation involve the establishment of a larger number of branches, equipment, and 
personnel to serve the retail customer.  These larger costs usually translate into a 
higher bank spread.  More so, than banks that are more oriented towards wholesale 
markets.  I suspect that many foreign banks in Chile are motivated to merge or acquire 
domestic banks, (who have established branches, equipment, and personnel in the 
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retail marketplace), as a way to increase profits much faster and perhaps less costly 
than trying to compete as de novo retail operations.  In return, domestic banks have 
access to new products and services, better technology, and a foothold in international 
markets through the merger of a foreign bank.  Figure 1, shows that domestic and 
foreign bank spreads move very much in tandem.   With the number of mergers and 
acquisitions since 1981, it is very likely that both domestic and foreign banks are 
competing for the same customers. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Chilean Bank Spreads 1995-2000 
 
Source:  Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004  
 
The Chilean Banking System, 2000-2013 
We now turn our attention to the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013 to 
investigate a decade of change between domestic and foreign banks and their impact 
on spreads.  As we can see from Table 5, Chile showed strong macroeconomic 

















crisis.   In 2009, annual GDP growth and inflation dipped to -1.0 percent and -2.6 
percent respectively.  However, both made a quick recovery in 2010 with GDP 
growth reaching 5.8 percent and inflation returning to 3.0 percent.  The national 
savings rate bounced between 20.8 percent in 2003 and 25.3 percent in 2006 before 
leveling off to 21.1 percent in 2013.  Per capita income increased greatly from $4,760 
in 2001 to a high of $15, 230 in 2013 while real interest rates rose to a high of 12.7% 
in 2008 and then retreated back to 7.4% in 2013. FDI increased from 5.8 percent of 
GDP ($US 4.2 billion) in 2001 to 7.3 percent of GDP ($US 20 billion) in 2013.  From 
a macroeconomic perspective, it appears that the Chilean economy came away from 
the 2008 financial crisis virtually unscathed.   
Table 5.  Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators. 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Annual  GDP Growth (%) 3.3 4.0 5.6 5.2 -1.0 5.8 4.1 
National Savings Rate (%) 21.5 20.8 23.5 24.7 22.4 22.3 21.1 
Per Capita Income ($US) 4760 4570 6250 8630 9940 12290 15230 
Inflation (%) 2.6 1.1 3.7 7.8 -2.6 3.0 1.5 
Real Interest Rates (%) 7.8 0.3 -0.8 3.7 3.3 5.5 7.4 
Foreign Direct Investment (% GDP) 5.8 5.5 5.6 7.2 7.5 9.3 7.3 
Source:  World Bank 
Note:  Table (even years) is available in the Appendix. 
 
 
From 2001-2009, the Heritage Foundation (2014) finds that Chile continued to 
use the market-based institutions and economic policies established by General 
Augusto Pinochet.  In 2010, Sebastian Pinera6 was elected as Chile’s 36th President.  
Shortly after his election, he raised corporate taxes and is considered to be more 
conservative than was General Pinochet.  Viewing table 6, we can see that Chile’s 
Heritage Foundation Index overall score improved further from 75.1 points in 2001 to 
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its highest score of 79 points in 2013.  Chile’s fiscal and monetary policy scores 
increased as well during this same time period.  The index score for Chile’s fiscal 
policy increased from 73.7 points in 2001 to 77.6 points in 2013, and Chile’s 
monetary policy index score increased from 82.4 points in 2001 to 84.6 points in 
2013.  Chile’s index score for government spending decreased slightly from 84.1 
points in 2001 to 83.7 points in 2013. 
Table 6.  Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores. 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Chile’s Overall Score 75.1 76.0 77.8 77.7 78.3 77.4 79.0 
Fiscal Policy 73.7 75.0 78.3 78.8 78.2 77.7 77.6 
Monetary Policy 82.4 83.0 84.4 79.8 77.3 77.9 84.6 
Government Spending 84.1 81.8 84.8 87.9 90.1 86.6 83.7 
Source:  The Heritage Foundation 
From 2001-2013, the Chilean banking system continued to show strong 
financial soundness indicators even in the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis.  
From Table 7, we can see that CAR and tier 1 ratios remained well above Basel III 
requirements from 2001-2013.  The banking system’s liquid assets during this time 
period reached a high of 21.3 percent in 2009 before declining to a low of 13.2 
percent in 2013.  Both return on assets (ROA) and equity bounced back from their 
1999 lows to soar to their highest levels in 2011 with ROA reaching 1.6 percent and 
equity reaching 20.8 percent.  The banking system reached a new high (since 1997) 
for non-performing loans of 3.0 percent in 2009 before decreasing to 2.1 percent in 
2013.   
 
_______________ 




Table 7.  Financial Soundness Indicators. 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Regulatory Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets (CAR) 12.7 14.5 13.0 12.2 14.3 13.9 13.0 
Tier 1 Capital 9.9 11.5 10.0 9.4 10.9 10.1 9.7 
Non-Performing Loans 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.8 3.0 2.3 2.1 
Return on Assets 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.5 
Equity 17.7 16.4 17.0 15.7 15.2 20.8 18.4 
Liquid Assets  17.2 16.9 19.8 15.5 21.3 15.2 13.2 
Source:  IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004 
  IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2011 
  IMF Chile: Country Report Chie No. 14/218.  2014 
   St. Louis Federal Reserve 
  World Bank 
   Author’s calculations 
Note: Table (even years) is available in the Appendix. 
 
In Table 8, we observe that Chile’s banking system concentrated further from 
2001-2013 with the total number of banks decreasing from 25 to 22 and the number 
of foreign banks decreasing from 15 to 12.  Foreign banks share of loans grew slightly 
from 43.9 percent to a high of 52.1 percent in 2011, before decreasing to 46.1 percent 
in 2013.  Concentration of the top-3 and top-5 banks market share of loans continued 
to increase to record highs of 56.1 percent and 76.0 percent in 2007 before decreasing 
(possibly due to the 2008 World Financial Crisis) to 41.5 percent and 59.7 percent 






Table 8.  Chile’s Banking System. 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Total Number of Banks 25 25 25 25 24 23 22 
Number of Foreign Banks 15 13 13 14 13 13 12 
Foreign Bank Share of Loans (%) 43.9 44.4 41 47.8 48.7 52.1 46.1 
Top-3 Bank Share of Loans (%) 42 50.8 51.3 56.1 44.4 45.1 41.5 
Top-5 Bank Share of Loans (%) 61.7 69.2 73.3 76.0 63.5 63.1 59.7 
Source: Superintendence of Banks 
 Author's calculations 
Note:  Table (even years) is available in the Appendix. 
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s  
 National Bank. 
Note:  A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign  
 Ownership Bank. 
 
 
Figure 2, shows that foreign and domestic spreads continue to move very 
much in tandem in Chile as they did from 1995-2000.  Foreign bank spreads lagged 
domestic bank spreads in the early 2000s, but their spreads have been higher than 
those of domestic banks since 2009.  Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) theorize that 
macroeconomic factors or similar cost structures may be affecting all banks in the 
system, as well as the possibility that foreign and domestic banks are competing with 
each other for the same customers.  The author(s) do not find inflation, real GDP 
growth, or real market interest rates to be significant from 1995-2000. I find that real 
GDP growth to be significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks only; 
however, the impact on spreads is very small.  A one standard deviation increase in 
real GDP growth lowers spreads by.00000003 standard deviation.  Also, I find that 
inflation and real market interest rates are not significant for either model.  Based on 
the results of Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and my own results, it is a possibility 
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that foreign and domestic banks are competing with each other for the same 
customers. 
 
Figure 2.  Chilean Bank Spreads 2000-2013 
 


























EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
I use panel data with time fixed-effects to explain changes in spreads over time 
for my empirical analysis, to study the impact that foreign banks have had on Chilean 
bank spreads from 2001-2013.  To estimate the changes in Chilean bank spreads, I 
build on the research conducted by Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) who define the 
dependent variable -  bank spread, as the total interest received from banks on loans 
divided by average loans, minus total interest paid on deposits divided by average 
deposits.   
Spreadi,t (domestic) = a0 +  a1Administrative Costsi,t + a2Crisisi,t + a3Equityi,t  
+ a4Fiscali,t + a5GDP Growth Ratei,t+ a6Governmenti,t + a7Inflationi,t 
+ a8Liquidityi,t + a9NPL’si,t + a10NPL’si,t + a11Real Interest Ratesi,t 
+  a12Top-5 Loansi,t+ ei,t 
Spreadi,t(Foreign) = a0 + a1Administrative Costsi,t + a2Crisisi,t + a3Equityi,t + a4FDIi,t 
+ a5Governmenti,t+ a6Inflationi,t + a7Liquidityi,t + a8Monetaryi,t 
+ a9NPL’si,t+ a10Pensioni,t + a11ROAi,t  + a12Top-5 Loansi,t + ei,t 
Where i refers to the bank id, and t refers to the time period under 
consideration. 
Using the Backward and Forward Stepwise Selection method, I reduce my 
independent macroeconomic, government policies, government spending, and bank-
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specific variables from 49 to 12 for my domestic and foreign bank models.  Data for 
my macroeconomic variables was obtained from the World Bank statistical database.  
Data for my government policies and spending variables was obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation; while, data for my bank-specific variables was obtained from 
various sources cited and using bank balance sheet and income statements from the 
Chilean Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) for years 2001-
2013.   
Macroeconomic Variables 
Inflation is defined by the World Bank as the ratio of GDP in current local 
currency divided by GDP in constant local currency.  Chile’s inflation rate averaged 
5.3 percent from 1995-2000 and 5.1 percent from 2001-2013.  In the literature, Brock 
and Suarez (2000) find the inflation rate to be significant at the 5 percent level and 
that a higher inflation rate raises the bank spread in Chile.  However, I find that the 
inflation rate is no longer significant for the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013. 
The 2008 world financial crisis variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for all 
banks in 2008; otherwise, it takes the value 0 for each year between 2001 and 2013.  I 
suspect that the Crisis would have some affect on banks spreads for Chilean banks 
and may have been the cause for higher bank spreads in 2008 and 2009.  However, 
my preliminary investigation shows that the 2008 world financial crisis variable is not 
significant for Chilean banks during this time period.   
The World Bank defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as net inflows (new 
investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign 
investors, and is divided by GDP.  In 1995, FDI was US$3 billion and in 2013, FDI 
had increased to US$20 billion.  Chile’s record high for FDI is US$28 billion, set in 
2012.  The International Monetary Fund (2003) finds that International banks both 
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help to originate, as well as widen the market for FDI financing through syndication 
to institutional investors and sales of loans in secondary markets.  All of Chile’s 
foreign banks are considered to be international banks.  Based on the IMF’s findings, 
I would expect the FDI variable to be significant for foreign banks, more so, than for 
domestic banks.  I find that FDI is not significant for domestic banks; however, I find 
that FDI is significant for foreign banks at the 10 percent level and raises spreads, but 
the impact is very small. 
The pension variable is defined as short-term (usually a month to several 
years) bank term-deposits from Chilean Pension Funds.  Ahumada and Cetorelli 
(2003) conduct a study from 1994 to 2001 on the effect of cross-industry ownership 
on pricing behavior of deposit and lending operations of banking institutions in Chile.   
The author(s) find that banks affiliated (ownership) with a Chilean Pension Fund, 
exhibit a substantially larger deposit base and enjoy higher spreads overall than 
unaffiliated banks.  Since 2001, four foreign banks continue to have an affiliation with 
Pension Funds.  I incorporate the pension variable into my foreign bank model to see 
if foreign banks still enjoy higher spreads from 2001-2013.  My analysis shows that 
foreign banks no longer enjoy higher spreads because of their affiliation with Pension 
Funds.  This may be one reason that explains why all the foreign banks in Chile have 
sold their pension funds. 
 The World Bank defines real GDP growth rate as a measure of economic 
growth adjusted for inflation.  In the literature, Chortareas, Garza-Garcia, and 
Girardone, (2011) conduct a study to in Latin America (including Chile) with a 
sample of 2,300 bank observations covering the period 1999-2006 and find that 
higher GDP growth in Chile lowers bank spreads.  The author(s) mention that this 
implies that for Chile and other Latin American countries, a better macroeconomic 
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environment decreases spreads, possibly by reducing the lending rate as a result of the 
lower credit risk of corporate and private borrowers.   Although, I find that real GDP 
growth is negatively correlated with spreads for domestic banks; this variable is no 
longer significant at the 10 percent level. 
The World Bank defines the real interest rate as the lending interest rate 
adjusted for inflation.  Gelos (2006) examines the determinants of bank interest 
margins using bank and country level data from 85 countries, including 14 Latin 
American economies from 1999-2002. The author(s) finds that the level of interest 
rates are strongly positively associated with higher spreads.  I find that the real 
interest rate is no longer significant for domestic banks. 
Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Variables 
I incorporate two variables into my domestic bank model, Chile’s fiscal 
freedom and government spending scores.  For my foreign bank model, I incorporate 
Chile’s monetary freedom score.  These three variables can be found in the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.  The Heritage Foundation defines fiscal 
freedom as a measure of the tax burden imposed by government. It includes both the 
direct tax burden in terms of the top tax rates on individual and corporate incomes and 
the overall amount of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.  Tables 9 and 10 show that 
Chile’s fiscal freedom policy score in 1995 was 79.4 percent.  In 2013, Chile’s score 
had fallen to 77.6 percent.  The foundation defines monetary freedom as a measure of 
price stability.  Chile’s monetary freedom policy score in 1995 was 66.1 percent.  In 
2013, Chile’s score had increased to 84.6 percent.  The foundation defines 
government spending as government expenditures including consumption and 
transfers.  Chile’s government spending score was 87.0 percent in 1995.  In 2013, 
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Chile’s score had fallen to 83.7 percent.  My preliminary results do not find these 
variables to be significant at the 10 percent level for either model.  
Bank-Specific Variables 
The administrative costs variable is the ratio of administrative costs including 
payroll, commissions, and other operating expenses divided by total assets.  Martinez 
Peria and Mody (2004) find that administrative costs are significant at the 1 percent 
level between 1995 and 2000 for all banks, but especially among foreign banks in the 
Chilean banking system.  The author(s) find that administrative costs have a large 
impact on bank spreads: a one standard deviation change in administrative costs for 
all banks results in a .652 standard deviation change increase in spreads.  We would 
expect foreign banks to have high start-up costs (especially as a de novo operation or 
from a merger or acquisition of a domestic bank) when first entering the banking 
system, but become more efficient like their parent companies over time.  Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) use 7900 bank observations from 80 countries 
from 1988-1995 and find that banks with high overhead costs exhibit a lack of 
efficient management and that foreign bank entry seems to improve the efficiency of 
domestic banks over time.  My analysis shows that both domestic and foreign banks 
are more efficient overall and that administrative costs are no longer significant for 
either, between 2001 and 2013.    
The non-performing loans variable is the ratio of non-performing loans (90 
days past due) divided by total loans.  In the literature, Brock and Suarez (2000) 
explore the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America (including Chile) during 
the mid-1990s and find that except for Columbia, non-performing loans are associated 
with lower spreads.  This result could be the result of inadequate provisioning for loan 
losses or it could reflect the fact that banks with a high proportion of bad loans may 
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lower spreads (raise deposit rates and lower loan rates) as a way of trying to grow out 
of their troubles.  Our preliminary investigation finds that the non-performing loans 
are significant at the 1 percent level for domestic banks and significant at the 5 
percent level for foreign banks from 2001-2013.  For domestic banks, a one standard 
deviation increase in non-performing loans results in a .05 standard deviation increase 
in bank spreads.  For foreign banks, a one standard deviation increase in non-
performing loans results in a .06 standard deviation increase in bank spreads.   
The liquidity variable is the ratio of liquid assets (cash and central bank reserves) 
divided by total assets.  This ratio is used to measure the bank’s ability to pay its 
short-term obligations.  Chile’s banking system has had liquidity ratios above 15 
percent since 1997.  It has just been recently that they have fallen under 15 percent, to 
13.3 percent in 2012 and 13.2 percent in 2013.  Shortly after the 2008 world financial 
crisis, Chile’s banks increased their liquidity ratios to the highest levels in a decade. In 
2009 the ratio was 21.3 percent and in 2010 the ratio was 20.5 percent.  Claessens and 
van Horen (2012) conduct a study of 137 countries (including Chile) over the period 
of 1995-2009 and find that foreign banks have more liquidity than domestic banks do.  
The author(s) suggest that foreign banks may be operating more conservatively 
compared to domestic banks.  I find also, that foreign banks in Chile have higher 
liquidity ratios than domestic banks.  Liquidity for foreign banks is significant at the 1 
percent level; a one standard deviation increase in liquidity results in a .008 standard 
deviation increase in bank spreads.  However, for domestic banks liquidity is not 
significant from 2001-2013. 
From a profitability standpoint, I incorporate both Return on Assets and Equity 
variables in both models.  The return on assets (ROA) variable is the ratio of net 
income divided by total assets. This ratio is used to measure how efficient bank’s are 
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at using their assets to generate profits.  The equity variable is the ratio of bank capital 
plus reserves divided by total assets.  This ratio measures the bank’s long-term ability 
to grow and pay back its debt.  Moguillansky, Studart and Vergara (2004) conduct a 
study of foreign banks in Latin America (including Chile) from 1990-2001 and find 
that there are no statistically significant differences in profitability between domestic 
and foreign banks, whether measured as the return on assets or as the return on equity.  
My analysis results are similar to those of the author(s) for domestic banks; however, 
I find that both ROA and equity are significant at the 5 percent level and both increase 
spreads for Chile’s foreign banks from 2001-2013. 
Table 9.  Panel Regressions for Chilean Domestic Bank Spreads. 
Variable P-Value T-Statistic Increase/Decrease in Spreads 
Administation Costs .146 -1.46 -.0000000009 
Crisis .165 -1.40 -.00093 
Equity .951 -0.06 -.00011 
Fiscal .799 -0.25 -.000002 
GDP Growth Rate .088 -1.73 -.000000031 
Government .276 1.09 .00007 
Inflation .328 -0.98 -.00005 
Liquidity .300 1.04 .00037 
Non-Performing Loans .000 3.84 .04755 
Market Interest Rates .201 1.29 .00007 
Return on Assets .623 0.49 .00598 
Top-5 Market Share (Loans) .087 1.73 .00295 
R-Squared 0.56   
F-Test 5.91   




The Top-5 bank market share of loans variable is defined as the share of loans 
held by the five largest banks in the system.  Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find 
that both the top-5 market share of loans and the HHI variables are significant at the 1 
percent level for domestic banks.  The author’s do not find either variable to be 
significant for foreign banks between 1995 and 2000.  My preliminary results show 
that the top-5 variable is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks 
between 2001 and 2013.  A one standard deviation increase in the top-5 bank market 
share results in a .003 standard deviation increase in bank spreads.  However, the HHI 
variable is not significant. 
Table 10.  Panel Regressions for Chilean Foreign Bank Spreads. 
Variable P-Value T-Statistic Increase/Decrease in Spreads 
Administation Costs .818 0.23 .00000000016 
Crisis .987 -0.02 -.000017 
Equity .018 2.40 .00921 
FDI .054 1.95 .00000012 
Government .504 0.67 .00012 
Inflation .890 -0.14 -.000021 
Liquidity .000 3.73 .00838 
Monetary .201 1.29 .00015 
Non-Performing Loans .026 2.26 .05948 
Pension Term Deposits .345 0.95 .000091 
Return on Assets .052 1.97 .03536 
Top-5 Market Share (Loans) .946 0.07 .00024 
R-Squared 0.32   
F-Test 11.39   




Has the Chilean Banking System Become More Concentrated? 
Figure 3, shows that the gap between the total number of banks and the 
number of foreign banks has been steadily getting narrower since 1982.  In 1982, 
there were 43 banks in the Chilean banking system, but in 2013 there were just 22 
banks remaining. In 1982, foreign banks represented 44% of total banks while in 2013 
foreign banks represented 55% of total banks.  The Chilean banking system has 
experienced explosive growth in banking assets, going from US $63 billion in 1995 to 
US $304 billion in 2013, a 382% increase.  Loans have grown at a faster pace than 
assets, growing from US $27 billion in 1995 to US $234 billion in 2013, a 766% 
increase.    
 
Figure 3.  The Chilean Banking System. 
Source: Superintendence of Banks   
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that the HHI, top-3 bank share, and the 
top-5 bank market share of loans is significant at the 1 percent level for domestic 
banks. The author(s) find that concentration leads to higher Chilean bank spreads 

















economies banking systems (including Chile) from 1995-2004 and finds that the 
Chilean banking system is concentrated, but the degree of competition is smaller than 
other emerging economies in the sample.  The author(s) finds also, that Chilean banks 
have spreads that are about 2 percentage points higher than the rest of the sample.  My 
preliminary results show that the top-5 largest bank with the largest share of the loans 
market is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks between 2001 and 
2013.  However, I find that the top-3 largest bank7 variable is not significant for 
domestic banks for this same time period.  For foreign banks, none of the variables 
are significant.  My results show that concentration levels have decreased in the 
Chilean banking system, especially for domestic banks from 2001-2013. 
In 1997, Chile’s Congress updated the banking laws to make foreign bank 
entry easier.  Also, the International Monetary Fund (2004) finds that in 2001, the 
Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) lowered minimum paid-
in capital requirements, in order to promote the development of niche banks and 
improve competition.  Between 2002 and 2004, six new foreign niche banks entered 
the market to compete in the retail, investment, foreign exchange, and leasing & 
factoring financing segments.  During this short time period from 2002-2004, the total 
number of banks reversed course for the first time since 1995 and increased from 24 
to 26.  However, because of multiple mergers during this same time period, the total 









Figure 4, shows concentration levels of loans increasing for both the top-three 
and top-five largest banks from 1995-2007 before starting to decrease in 2008.  It may 
well be that the 2008 world financial crisis helped reverse the course of loan growth 
among the top-3 and top-5 largest banks.  The figure shows the top-3 and top-5 largest 
banks losing market share back to 1997 levels through 2013.   
 
Figure 4.  Concentration levels in the Chilean banking system. 
(Share of loans for the top-3 and top-5 largest banks, in percentages) 
Source:  Author’s calculations  
 
Although, I believe that the 2008 world crisis may have had some effect on the 
number of loans decreasing from 2008; it may be possible that the new banking laws 
for establishing de novo banking operations in sectors of the economy that are highly 
concentrated, may have more to do with the number of loans decreasing from 2008.  
By selectively placing new banks in sectors of the economy that are highly 
concentrated, this increased competition allows for loans to be more evenly 
distributed across banks in those sectors, and thus allowing concentration in those 















In 1981, Chile switched from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded defined 
contribution pension plan.  The new pension plan was no longer managed by the 
government but managed by private pension fund administrative companies called 
(Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones8, or AFPs).   AFP’s offered one fund 
(referred to as fund C) in 1981 and were required by law9 to invest employee 
contributions in low risk domestic assets such as time deposits and government bonds.  
This new defined contribution pension plan requires employees to contribute 10% of 
their monthly earnings plus administrative fees and premiums for disability and 
survivors’ insurance to their individual accounts (OECD, 2011).   
According to the Superintendence of Pensions10 or SAFP (2010), the Chilean 
Pension System experienced high concentration through multiple mergers and 
acquisitions with the number of AFP’s decreasing from fifteen in 1995 to only eight 
in 2000.  Table 11, shows that during the 1995-2000 time periods, AFP fund assets 
grew from $32.8 billion to $51.7 billion making the pension system the second-largest 
contributor to the Chilean banking system behind banks.  Assets as a percent of GDP 
grew from 36.5% in 1995 to 50.6% in 2000.  Fund C returned an annual real rate of 
return of -2.5% in 1995 and an annual real rate of return of 16.2% in 1999.  While net 
commissions paid by employees decreased slightly from 3.2% to 2.7% for this same 
time period, administrative costs rose from .03% to 1.17%.  Also, bank term deposits 
in 1995 were 5.3% but grew rapidly to 18.7% by 2000. 
________________ 
8In 1981, Chile replaced its public pension with privately managed individual accounts. These private firms are called 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or (AFPs).  
9Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) discuss in their paper that Chilean pension funds are required by law to invest a fraction of their 
managed funds in bank deposits. 
10Superintendence of Pensions (SAFP) is the Chilean Pensions Supervisor who regulates the Chilean Pension System.  More 





Table 11.  AFP Indicators 1995-2000 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of AFP's 15 12 12 9 8 8 
AFP Term Deposits (%) 5.3 4.2 10.7 13.6 16.1 18.7 
Average Real Rate of Return for Fund C (%) -2.5 3.5 4.8 -1.1 16.3 4.4 
Net Commission Paid by Employees (%) 3.1 3 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.5 
Administrative Costs (% of fund) 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.47 1.17 
Pension Fund Assets (billion US$) 32.8 34.9 38.2 39.6 48.1 51.7 
Pension Assets (% of GDP) 36.5 37.4 39.0 40.2 49.1 50.6 
HHI 13.1 13.4 13.9 16.9 20.8 20.7 
Source:  Superintendencia de Pensiones 2010 
  Central Bank of Chile 
 
Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) find that banks with a pension fund affiliation 
(ownership of the fund), offer higher deposits rates and charge higher loan rates than 
unaffiliated banks.  Also, their interest rate spreads are higher than average.   By 
2001, the number of pension funds had been reduced to seven, with the four largest 
funds owned by foreign banks namely, Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco Penta, and 
BBVA.  The author(s) find that affiliated banks can count on a more stable supply of 
deposits, which would support a more aggressive lending strategy.  Taking on riskier 
investment projects could generate a higher rate of return on the lending portfolio, 
together with broader interest margins and higher profitability.  Their research shows 
that from 1995-2001, affiliated banks enjoyed much higher AFP pension fund 
deposits than did non-affiliated banks.   
In 2002, a new federal regulation was put in place that required AFP’s to offer 
three additional funds, referred to as Funds B, C, D, and E which vary by different 
degrees of risk.  AFP’s may also offer Fund A, which has the highest degree of risk 
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with a maximum limit in equities of up to 80%.  Fund E, has the lowest risk with zero 
equities.  Fund C, continues to be the original fund that was established in 1981.  The 
International Monetary Fund (2011) finds that the Chilean pension system has 
averaged a little over 9 percent average historic real rate of return since 1981.  
However, going forward, achieving long-term real returns in the 6 percent range may 
prove challenging.  
In 2008, Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet11 (2006-2010) applied pressure 
to Congress to pass pension reform Law 20.255.12  The new regulations were put in 
place to increase AFP competition and reduce high pension fund costs.  Kritzer, 
Barbara E. (2008) finds that pension fees as a percentage of member contributions in 
2008 was 14.6%, making Chile’s pension fund administration fees the third highest in 
Latin America behind Argentina and Peru. The law mandates that: 
• AFP’s must eliminate their fixed monthly administration fees they charge 
to their members.  
• AFP’s must eliminate fees when members transfer their balances from 
another AFP. 
• All AFP’s must offer a single fee based on the percentage of member’s 
earnings. 
• All new members entering the pension system will be assigned to the 
AFP with the lowest fees for a 2 year period. 
• New regulations allow AFP’s to outsource most of their administrative 
functions to help improve efficiency. 
• Insurance companies are now allowed to enter the market by setting up 
AFP subsidiaries.   
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Table 12, shows that from 2000-2013, the Chilean pension system 
concentrated further with the number of AFP’s decreasing from seven to six.  Pension 
fund assets grew from $51.7 billion to $163.9 billion while pension assets as a percent 
of GDP grew from 50.6% to 62.2%.  During the 2008 world economic crisis, Fund 
C’s average real rate of return was -18.9%, but bounced back in 2009 with a return of 
12.6%.  The fund’s return in 2013 was .7%.  Net commissions paid by employees 
decreased from 2.5% to 1.5%, while administrative costs increased from 1.16% to 
1.25% over the same time period.  Term deposits were 18.7% in 2000 but fell to 4.8% 
in 2013. 
Table 12.  AFP Indicators. 
 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Number of AFP's 7 7 6 6 5 6 6 
AFP Term Deposit’s (%) 17.5 15.0 20.8 18.4 7.5 6.7 4.8 
Average Real Rate of Return for Fund C (%) 6.7 10.6 4.6 5.0 12.6 -3.8 0.7 
Net Commission Paid by Employees (%) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 
Administrative Costs (% of fund) 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.25 1.25 n.a. n.a. 
Pension Fund Assets (billion US$) 56.9 69.6 85.1 110.8 119 134.9 164 
Pension Assets (% of GDP) 53.2 57.7 57.9 64.4 62.0 58.0 62.2 
HHI 20.9 21.4 21.4 21.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source:  Superintendencia de Pensiones 2010 
  Central Bank of Chile 
  OECD Stat Extracts   
Note: The complete table (includes even years) is available in the Appendix. 
 
 
In 1995, the limit that pension funds could invest internationally was only 6 
percent.  In 2013, the limit has increased to 15 percent for Fund C.  Although AFP’s 
could invest more funds oversea during the 2000’s, bank term deposits didn’t 
decrease until after the 2008 world economic crisis.  In 2009, AFP’s reduced their 
term deposits from 20 percent to 7.7 percent.  The International Monetary Fund 
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(2014) finds that banks reduced their dependence on institutional deposits from 2009–
2011, while mutual funds have become the biggest institutional depositor during this 
same time period.  Deposits from mutual funds have on average a shorter maturity 
than those from pension funds.  At the end of 2011, AFP term deposits were just 6.7 
percent while mutual funds deposits13 accounted for 21 percent of total term deposits 
in the Chilean banking system. 
Ahumada and Cetorelli (2003) find also, that the process of deregulation, 
which has made pensions funds less dependent on domestic sources of investment, 
seem to have reduced the importance for banks to tie themselves to a pension fund via 
common ownership.  Shortly after Law 20.255 was passed in 2008, Banco Santander 
sold A.F.P. Bansander to the ING Group.  Citibank sold its 40.23 percent indirect 
ownership in A.F.P. Habitat, Chile’s 2nd largest pension fund to Sociedad de 
Inversiones y Servicios la Construcción, S.A. (Invesco) and Inversiones Provisionales 
S.A. (Inpresa) in 2010.  Banco Penta sold A.F.P. Cuprum, Chile’s 3rd largest pension 
fund to Principal Financial Group in 2012.  Lastly, BBVA sold A.F.P. Provida, 
Chile’s largest pension fund to MetLife in 2013. 
Although Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco Penta, and BBVA are no longer 
affiliated with AFP’s, I incorporated pension fund term deposits into my foreign bank 
model from 2001-2013, because of the significant influence term deposits had on 
foreign bank spreads from 1994-2001.  My preliminary findings show that pension 
fund term deposits are no longer significant from 2001-2013. 
_____________________________________ 
11 Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet served from 2006-2010. 
12Chile’s pension reform Law 20.255 was passed March 2008 was established to include more workers in Chile and to promote 
more competition among pension fund management companies. 
13IMF: Chile selected issues, July 2014. 
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There may be many reasons to explain why Banco Santander, Citibank, Banco 
Penta, and BBVA sold their AFP pension fund businesses.  It is certainly possible that 
Law 20.255 will increase AFP competition and reduce high pension fund costs over 
the long run.  If this is the case however, then pension funds profitability will be 
reduced.  Also, with stronger regulations regarding new members, if an AFP does not 
have the lowest fees at the beginning of every two-year window; the AFP is at risk of 
not growing its membership on a consistent basis.  AFP’s that do not consistently lead 
with the lowest fees will see their membership and assets decline over time.   
Are Banks Finding it Easier to Enter the Chilean Banking System Since 1997 
When Congress Passed the General Banking Act? 
 
Karasulu (2007) finds that regulatory barriers to bank entry in Chile are among 
the lowest by international standards.  However, the IMF (2005) finds that the Chilean 
banking system maintains capitalization levels well above the minimum regulatory 
requirements and also above those in most other countries.  These high levels, which 
contribute to banks’ financial stability, may also act as effective entry costs, 
particularly given the relatively small size of the Chilean banking system.  On 
average, a one percent market share (in terms of non-risk weighted assets) in the 
Chilean banking system costs about 8 percent more in equity capital.  When adjusted 
for banking risks, the premium for Chile is about 10 percent higher than on average in 
the other countries. 
In the existing literature, Levine and Carkovic (2002) conduct a study of 
Chilean banks between 1976 and 1998 and find that while foreign banks could enter 
Chile, they were required to purchase a domestic bank to enter; they could not simply  
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apply and receive a new banking license.  The new General Banking Act14 passed in 
1997 was designed to help loosen the tight restrictions on bank entry, improve 
competition, and lower concentration. 
According to SBIF, eleven new foreign banks have entered the Chilean 
banking system since 2000.  Although four foreign banks did purchase a domestic 
bank to enter the system, seven other banks entered the market as de novo operations. 
The seven banks that entered the market as de novo operations compete with local 
banks in niche markets such as investment banking, retail, and short-term company 
financing. It appears that many of these new banks have started to add additional 
products and services since inception.  The niche market(s) that each bank set out to 
compete in continues to be their dominant line of business at least, for now.  It is still 
unclear if Chile will allow a new de novo bank to open its doors as a full service 
commercial bank in the future.  
Chile may not be experiencing concentration across all sectors of its economy.  
My research shows that only domestic banks are experiencing concentration; at least, 
for the top 5 largest domestic banks from 2001-2013.  Foreign banks are not 
experiencing concentration for this same time period.  Further research is needed to 
determine which sectors these domestic banks dominant.  Chile can continue to place 
niche banks in highly concentrated sectors of the banking system to increase 
competition and lower concentration, but only in those sectors of the economy.  Thus, 
the rest of the banking system would not be disrupted.  I theorize that it is the 
establishment of niche banks placed in selectively concentrated sectors of the 
economy that has led to the decrease of concentration in those sectors of the economy 
and perhaps has led to lower concentration overall in the Chilean banking system. 
33 
 
Diversification of the banking system with the establishment of niche banks can lead 
to the reduction of bank concentration when placed in selectively highly concentrated 
sectors of the economy.  Further, diversification allows for increased competition in 
those sectors without affecting the other sectors of the economy and the overall health 

























This paper examines the determinants of bank interest rate spreads for both 
domestic and foreign Banks in the Chilean banking system from 2001-2013.  Using 
the Backward and Forward Stepwise Selection method to construct my panel 
regressions, I compare my findings to those of Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and 
other author(s) who have studied the impact that foreign banks have had on domestic 
bank spreads and concentration in the Chilean banking system, previously. 
I find that non-performing loans for both domestic and foreign banks lead to 
higher bank spreads.  I find also, that administrative costs are no longer significant for 
all banks from 2001-2013.  Many research papers have theorized that foreign banks 
help domestic banking systems to become more efficient over time.  It appears that 
domestic banks in Chile have become more efficient since 2000.  It’s certainly 
possible that the theory holds for the Chilean domestic banking system today. 
Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and others find that higher bank 
concentration raises spreads significantly for all banks in Chile from 1995-2000.  
Although, I find that bank concentration raises spreads significantly for domestic 
banks; I find also, that bank concentration does not raise spreads significantly for 
foreign banks in Chile from 2001-2013.  Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find also, 
that the top-5 banks with the largest share of loans is significant at the 1 percent level 
for domestic banks in Chile from 1995-2000.  I find that the top-5 banks with the 
largest share of loans is significant at the 10 percent level for domestic banks from 
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2001-2013. It’s possible that the establishment of niche banks has lead to the 
reduction of bank concentration in those sectors of the Chilean economy that were 
highly concentrated from 1995-2000.  Thus, leading to a small reduction (significance 
went from 1 percent to 10 percent) in concentration overall, for domestic banks from 
2001-2013.  Further research is needed to determine if diversification is still working 








































Table 1.  Chile’s Macroeconomic Indicators. 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Annual  GDP Growth (%) 2.2 6.0 4.4 3.3 5.8 5.4 
National Savings Rate (%) 21.9 22.8 25.3 22.3 24.1 21.4 
Per Capita Income ($US) 4487 6224 9371 10686 12682 15246 
Inflation (%) 4.2 7.5 12.8 0.5 8.8 1.3 
Real Interest Rates (%) 3.4 -2.2 -4.3 12.7 -3.7 8.6 
Source:  World Bank 
 
Table 2.  Chile’s Overall, Fiscal, Monetary, and Government Spending Scores. 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Fiscal 74 78.5 78.6 78.1 77.5 77.4 
Gov’t Spending 82.7 81.5 87.5 88.2 89.6 82.1 
Monetary 82.7 84.2 86.9 78.8 73.0 85.6 










Table 3.  Financial Soundness Indicators. 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Regulatory Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets 
14.0 15.1 12.5 12.5 14.1 13.3 
Tier 1 Capital 11.1 11.9 9.3 9.6 10.1 10.0 
Non-Performing Loans 2.0 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.7 2.2 
ROA 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.4 
ROE 14.4 16.7 18.6 13.2 18.5 17.3 
Liquidity 18.7 18.9 16.8 17.5 20.5 13.3 
Source: IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2004 
 IMF Chile: Financial system stability assessment 2011 
  IMF Chile: Country Report Chie No. 14/218.  2014 
  Central Bank of Chile 
 World Bank 
  Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4.  Chile’s Banking System. 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Total number of banks 24 26 25 24 24 23 
Number of foreign banks 14 13 13 13 13 12 
Foreign bank share of loans (%) 44.1 39.1 41.3 47.9 46.5 47.0 
Top-3 bank share of loans (%) 52.8 52.6 51.8 45.9 44.7 44.5 
Top-5 bank share of loans (%) 69.6 71.4 72.1 64.3 63.5 62.6 
Source: Superintendence of Banks 
 Author's calculations 
  A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 percent foreign ownership. 
Note: The total number of foreign banks excludes Banco Estado, Chile’s  
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